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Armed conflicts and insecurity are threats to economic activities for many developing countries as it disrupts various channels of economic growth. Apart from the immediate killing and destruction of physical infrastructure (ICRC, 2021), armed conflicts can have several indirect repercussions on children’s nutrition and health which substantially increases the overall cost of conflict. Children residing in armed conflicts areas are at a significantly higher risk of experiencing malnutrition, with over double the likelihood compared to those residing in peaceful areas (Save the Children, 2021). The disruption
of food systems, forced-displacement, economic instability, direct violence and challenges accessing clean water or healthcare services can all contribute to child malnutrition in armed conflicts areas (Stewart et al., 1997; Kirschner, Finaret, 2021; Eseosa EkhatorMobayode et al., 2022). The early stages of life, particularly infancy, is critical in shaping an individual long-term health, education and employment prospects (Strauss, Thomas,1998; Behrman, Rosenzweig, 2004; Maccini, Yang, 2009), as such, nutrition shocks resulting from conflicts during this period can have significant implications for economic growth and welfare.
Several studies conducted in developing world concluded that children living in regions affected by armed conflicts experience adverse health outcomes (Camacho, 2008; Akresh et al., 2012; Mainuddin et al., 2015). Nonetheless, a majority of these studies have certain limitations due to the unobserved heterogeneity of the population under examination, which can result in an under or overestimation of the true effect of the conflict exposition. Out of the various factors contributing to heterogeneity, the level of bargaining power held by mothers of the children is particularly crucial. In fact, a flourishing literature links a woman increased ability to make choices to an improvement in children schooling, health and nutrition (Duflo, 2003; Qian, 2008; Lépine, Strobl, 2013; Imai et al., 2014). Assuming there is a correlation between bargaining power and child nutrition, the impact of armed conflicts on child nutrition would vary between those born to mothers with high bargaining power and those born to mothers with low bargaining power.
This paper seeks to provide evidence-based insights into the complex interplay between armed conflicts, women’s bargaining power and child’s nutrition with the aim of identifying effective strategies to improve the nutritional status of children in conflictaffected areas. It is build on the assumption that in the household where females have high bargaining power, the investment in children health and nutrition is higher (all things being equal) therefore it may play a mitigating role in protecting children from the exposition to the conflict. To investigate this potential scenario, I use data from the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency in Nigeria. Since 2009, the northeastern regions of Nigeria have been facing the BH insurgency, a group which aims to topple the existing government and establish an Islamic law-based regime. Research conducted in Nigeria indicates that this region experienced a considerable decrease in total agricultural output and productivity (Adelaja, George, 2019), ultimately leading to higher levels of food insecurity (Kaila, Azad, 2023) which particularly affect children nutrition (Ekhator-Mobayode, Asfaw, 2019). The BH insurgency has also been found to reduce access to maternal healthcare services, including antenatal care visits, delivery at a healthcare center and delivery by a skilled health professional, which increases the risk of undernutrition and child mortality (Chukwuma,Ekhator Mobayode, 2019). The sample for this study is derived from the recode of the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) conducted in 2008, 2013, and 2018 and comprises more than 35,339 children under the age of five. The outcome variables of interest are anthropometric indicators for children: Weight for Age z-scores (WAZ), Height for Age Z-scores (HAZ) and the Weight for Height Z-scores (WHZ). Information on the BH insurgency is drawn from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). I spatially match each armed conflict event with at least one fatality related to BH that happened between 2009 (the year in which the BH conflict started) and 2018 to the NDHS cluster to build the exposition variable.
I started my investigation by running a regression model without any of the proxies of maternal bargaining power. The results suggest that the overall effect of the conflict on children nutrition is negative and statistically significant. In the following steps, using several proxies for maternal bargaining power, I find that each additional BH conflict negatively affect child nutrition hence increase the probability of undernutrition (specially for the WAZ and the WHZ) for children born to mothers with low level of bargaining power. Also, the effect of the BH conflict on children born to mothers with low levels of bargaining power is more pronounced for male children; the difference with female children born to the same group of women is not significant. The effect on children born to mothers with high bargaining power was not significant and similar for both boys and girls. The difference between the children born to the two groups of women is significant. I also found that older children (aged between 2 and 5) born to mothers with a low level of bargaining power are more affected by the conflict and there is a preference for first-born children among women with high bargaining power.
Overall, this study highlights the importance of considering women’s bargaining power when studying children’s nutritional status, as it is a source of heterogeneity and an effective tool in improving children’s nutrition especially in conflict-affected areas. The evidence suggests that policies and interventions designed to mitigate the negative impact of armed conflict on children’s nutrition can utilize progress in the level of women’s bargaining power alongside other protective measures.
