Unconditional Cash Transfers and Child Labor and Schooling in Turkey: Short-Term Evidence from the Family Support Program^{*}

Aysun Hiziroglu Aygun¹

We examine how a modest unconditional cash transfer policy affects child labor and schooling during periods of economic crisis by studying Turkey's Family Support Program, launched in 2022. Using a regression discontinuity design based on the program's per capita income eligibility threshold, we analyze the program's short-term effects within six months of implementation. Despite the program's relatively modest transfer amounts—approximately one-third of the monthly minimum wage—we find significant reductions in children's participation in family businesses and agricultural work. Notably, these labor reductions occurred without corresponding increases in school enrollment or time spent on educational activities, which were already high at baseline. We also find improvements in children's emotional well-being and daily protein consumption, suggesting that even a modest transfer policy can enhance child welfare through multiple channels.

Keywords: cash transfers; education; child labor; regression discontinuity design; program evaluation; Turkey

JEL codes: I21, I28, I38, J21

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⁺ Istanbul Technical University, Department of Economics, Istanbul 34367, Türkiye. e-mail: <u>aysunaygun@itu.edu.tr.</u>

1. Introduction

An estimated 160 million children worldwide engage in child labor (ILO, 2024), often at the expense of their education and long-term well-being. These children are usually deprived of their education, live in poverty, and work to generate income to support their families (Dar et al., 2002). Engaging in child labor creates long-term losses as children who work are more likely to drop out of and or not attend school regularly (Beegle et al., 2009).

Unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) are a promising tool for reducing child labor in developing countries. By alleviating immediate financial constraints, these programs may reduce the need for children to work. However, their effectiveness during economic crises, especially with modest transfer amounts, is not well understood. In this study, we examine Turkey's Family Support Program (FSP)—a large-scale UCT policy—to assess how cash assistance affects child labor, schooling, and well-being in a period of economic turbulence.

Turkey experienced a high inflation period, which peaked at 85.5% in October 2022. This placed immense financial pressure on low-income families. In response, the FSP was launched in June 2022, offering monthly cash transfers for one year to qualifying households.¹ By the end of 2022, the program had reached 3 million households—approximately 9 million individuals, given Turkey's average household size which is 3.17 (TurkStat, 2022). Despite its scale, FSP payments were relatively modest, ranging between 850–1,900 Turkish Lira (TL) per month, with the maximum amount representing just over one-third of Turkey's minimum wage in 2022.² The total program expenditure amounted to 13 billion TL in 2022, or 0.087% of GDP within its first six months.

To evaluate the program's impact, we use data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS) collected by the Turkey Statistical Institute (TurkStat) between October and December 2022. The survey indicates that 12.3% of households received family support within the past year.³ We leverage

¹ A separate program Emergency Social Safety Net is another unconditional cash transfer program that targets refugees who live in Turkey.

² The transfers depend on the monthly per capita household income and range as follows:1250 TL payment for an income of 450 TL or lower, 1100 TL payment for an income between 450 TL and 911 TL, 950 TL payment for an income between 911 TL and 1372 TL, and 850 TL payment for an income between 1372 TL and 1833 TL. The child support component ranges between 350-650 TL depending on the number of children.

³ Although the survey does not distinguish between unconditional cash transfers and other types of family support, it predominantly captures the FSP due to its higher statistical likelihood compared to other forms of assistance within the family support category. FSP reached 3 million households in 2022. In contrast, other transfers covered a smaller number of individuals: For example, widow payment was given to 89 thousand women, military family support to 65

a regression discontinuity design (RDD), exploiting the program's income eligibility threshold set at one-third of the after-tax minimum wage—to estimate the causal impact of cash transfer policy on children's schooling, labor participation, and well-being.

Despite FSP's relatively small payments, we find significant reductions in child labor within just six months of implementation. These effects are driven primarily by declines in family-based and agricultural work, contrasting with evidence from Malawi and Zambia, where UCTs increased family labor participation by enabling household investment in productive activities (Covarrubias et al., 2012; de Hoop et al., 2020). However, we also observe a small increase in children's engagement in selling homemade goods or agricultural products, though this effect is very small in magnitude and only significant in broader bandwidths. Similarly, while the policy reduces the likelihood of children cooking, its effects on other domestic tasks, such as cleaning, caregiving, and shopping, remain insignificant.

We find no significant effect on time spent in school or studying, suggesting that the transfers primarily influenced labor allocation rather than school attendance or time allocated to educational activities. Additionally, we observe improvements in children's emotional well-being and increased consumption of protein-rich foods, indicating broader welfare benefits beyond labor market outcomes.

While the one-third minimum wage threshold also increases eligibility for food and shelter assistance, prior research suggests that cash transfers have stronger effects on child labor and schooling than in-kind support (Tagliati, 2022). To ensure the robustness of our findings, we also verify that our main results remain unchanged when we exclude food and shelter support beneficiaries from the analysis. Nevertheless, we report reduced-form effects and interpret our results as capturing the combined impact of both cash and in-kind support.

We focus on children aged 5–12, for whom the opportunity cost of schooling is lower and an increase in family income is less likely to generate a significant impact (Edmonds and Schady, 2012). Turkey's high primary school enrollment rate (96%) allows us to assess how cash transfers influence labor decisions without confounding effects from low baseline school participation. Our

thousand households, 47 thousand children who lost a parent received cash support, 816 thousand mothers received newborn cash support, and 28 thousand received multiple birth support.

findings demonstrate that even a modest UCT policy can alter household labor allocation without disrupting school attendance patterns.

Beyond labor and schooling outcomes, we uncover important secondary effects on children's wellbeing. The program improved children's emotional health and increased their consumption of protein-rich foods, suggesting that even a policy offering modest transfers can enhance child welfare through multiple channels. These findings contribute to our understanding of how cash transfer programs can support vulnerable populations during economic uncertainty even with smaller transfer amounts.

Our study builds on previous research by examining a one-year UCT program's short-term effects on children's labor, schooling, and well-being. Prior studies have shown that UCTs can increase schooling (Baird et al., 2011) or have heterogeneous effects depending on the context (Baird et al., 2014; Handa et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2020; Sessou et al., 2024). While some programs reduce child labor (Edmonds, 2006; Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Tagliati, 2022), others—such as those in Malawi and Zambia—have increased it by encouraging household investments in family businesses (Covarrubias et al., 2012; de Hoop et al., 2020). Our findings align more closely with Sessou et al. (2024), who report a decline in agricultural and family work following UCTs in Mali, though in their case, the impact on schooling was stronger with lower baseline enrollment rates.

Finally, our study highlights the importance of economic and social context in shaping the effects of UCTs. Previously, Hiziroglu Aygun et al. (2024) showed that the UCT of a similar amount offered to refugee households had a substantial impact on reducing child labor and increasing school enrollment of refugee children.⁴ In the case of refugee children, the cash was accompanied by policies that encouraged school integration such as language training, pre-educational programs, and backup courses. Another difference is the prevalence of child labor among the refugee and native families as child labor was more common among the refugee children who live in more crowded and poorer families. Building on this, our study documents that similar effects do not hold for low-income native households which helps to understand the broader implications of cash assistance programs in alleviating child labor and improving educational outcomes in economically vulnerable populations.

⁴ An average refugee household's ESSN cash transfer paid 105 USD per month, and a native household's FSP transfer paid around 102 USD in 2022 if the family had 5 children and a monthly income of 450TL per capita.

2. Background: Family Support Program

The Ministry of Family and Social Services (MoFSS) of Turkey provides various forms of family support to low-income families under specific conditions. These include one-time transfers to families with a newborn child, ongoing transfers for families with multiples up to age two, and assistance for women who lost a husband or children who lost a parent. Additionally, cash assistance is available for families of those in military service, veterans, and martyrs. To qualify for these transfers, applicants must meet one of the specified categories and demonstrate economic need for social assistance.

The coverage of the family support programs was extended in 2022 with the introduction of the unconditional cash transfer program, Turkey Family Support Program (FSP), which offers regular monthly payments to low-income families for one year. The cash transfer program is offered based on income eligibility, which is set as the per capita income being less than one-third of the after-tax minimum wage.

The FSP is the first need-based unconditional cash transfer program in Turkey that is available to a wide range of Turkish nationals without eligibility requirements tied to events such as the loss of a family member or the birth of a child. The program was designed to be inclusive and reach families who did not fit into the other categories supported by the social assistance system. FSP also does not exclude households with a member in formal employment (i.e. registered with the social security system) unlike most other programs in Turkey, such as universal health insurance.⁵ Turkish citizens above age 18 can apply for the FSP transfers. Applications for the FSP can be submitted through the e-Government Gateway (e-Devlet Kapisi) or directly to the relevant Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SASF) located at the applicant's registered residential address. A SASF office is available in every province and district, and every office operates independently. SASFs are not part of the administrative structure of the MoFSS. However, their oversight is carried out jointly by three ministries including the MoFSS. When an eligible household applies for the FSP benefits, the benefits begin if the Board of Trustees of the SASF approves the application. Benefits last for 12 months and may pause or stop if the SASF determines a change in the household's address or eligibility status.

⁵ The only exclusion criteria for FSP are having a civil servant, a muhtar (the elected neighborhood heads), or a notary in the household.

There are also other social assistance programs organized in other categories within the MoFSS operations. Some of these programs also use the same income eligibility rule as the FSP. Among those, multiple-birth transfers are given on the condition of giving birth to multiples. Elderly and disability transfers are provided if the family lacks social security and an old-age (above 65) or disabled member exists. Government-subsidized health insurance is also conditional on lacking social security. Education materials and food, shelter, and transportation support for the children who live outside the bussed-schooling system are provided for the children who attend school. The food and shelter program provides food before the religious holidays (which can be extended throughout the year in case needed) or helps with heating based on the income eligibility threshold. In that sense, the income eligibility rule is not unique to the UCTs we study. Hence, we test how the likelihood of receiving family support and other benefits in the last 12 months is affected by the eligibility rule based on the household's income per capita. In Table 1, we show that both FSP and food and shelter recipiency are significantly more likely for households with a per capita income below one-third of the minimum wage. Therefore, we interpret our results as the joint effect of being eligible for these programs and provide reduced-form results of the RDD analysis.

3. Dataset: Turkey Child Survey

We use the micro dataset Turkey Child Survey (TCS), obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). The survey was carried out in collaboration with TurkStat, the MFSP's General Directorate of Child Services, and UNICEF Turkey. The fieldwork for the TCS was conducted by the TurkStat across Turkey between October 10 and December 16, 2022. The study sample includes 9,010 households with at least one child aged 0-17. The sample size of the study was designed to be representative of Turkey.

Information about children aged 0-17 living in the sampled households was collected. Mothers or primary caregivers provided information about the household and on various topics for children younger than age thirteen. The topics include education, living conditions, early childhood development, health, disabilities, school quality of life, parental involvement, breastfeeding and nutrition, social and cultural participation, child labor, and child discipline.

The survey collected child labor and schooling information only for children aged five and above. We limit our sample to children below the age of thirteen due to the data collection design of the survey. Mothers were surveyed about children in this age range, ensuring consistent information for these observations. For older children (ages thirteen and above), the survey directly interviewed the children themselves, introducing potential biases as observations were dropped if the child was absent at the time of the survey. Therefore, we use the 5-12 age range as the most reliable sample for our analysis.

The household income is reported by the survey respondent. We calculate the per capita household income by using the number of residents related to the household head as recorded in the household member information questionnaire. In our analysis, we use several outcome variables, including dummies for family work, agricultural work, and domestic work of children. We also analyze children's time spent in working, school, and studying as well as daily food consumption, and children's health and well-being.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our analysis. They refer to the children living in households with a 900 TL bandwidth on both sides of the cutoff. The descriptive statistics provide an overview of children's participation in non-market work, domestic work, time allocation, food consumption, and health outcomes. Paid employment is very rare in this age group as only 0.3% of the children engage in market work. Participation in non-market work is also relatively low, with 3.3% of children working for their families, 0.4% selling homemade goods or agricultural products, and 9.1% engaged in agricultural activities. School enrollment is high in the age group we study with 96% of the children. Domestic work is more common, with 33.7% of children involved in shopping, 14.9% in cleaning, and 41.8% engaged in at least one type of domestic task.

On average, children spend 0.37 weekly hours on market work and 0.93 weekly hours on domestic work. They dedicate 5.66 hours per day to school, 3.96 hours per week to studying on weekdays, and 1.88 hours per week on weekends.

In terms of daily food consumption, 54.5% of children consume fruits, 32.6% consume vegetables, 11.6% consume proteins, and 10.9% consume pulses, while higher proportions report consuming grains (65.8%) and dairy products (59.1%). However, consumption of less healthy items such as soda drinks (15.8%), sweets (36.4%), and unhealthy snacks (23.6%) is also notable. Regarding health outcomes, 27.8% of children reported experiencing a health problem in the last two weeks, and 7.5% had an untreated health issue during this period. Approximately 32.5% of children were reported as seeming depressed or unhappy as often as once a week or every day and 35.5% of children in the sample were reported as seeming anxious or worried.

The descriptive statistics in Table 2 further provide insights into children's beneficiary status on social transfers. Among the children in our sample, 13.3% benefit from the FSP, while only 1.8% receive Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) for attending school. The share of children benefiting from education material support stands at 4.5%, while 5.9% receive assistance for food and shelter. Disability and old-age benefits are accessed by 4.3% of the children's households, and 6.5% benefit from health-related transfers. Other forms of support are less common, with only 1.9% reporting access to other social benefits.

We also summarize the descriptive statistics of the control variables we use in our regressions in Table 2. Most household heads have a middle school education (53.1%) and are employed (74%), with a smaller proportion being unemployed (4%) or not in the labor force (13.7%). Households, on average, include 0.36 children under 5, 1.65 children aged 5–12, and 0.41 children aged 13–17, with 2.5 adults. Only 0.8% of the households have multiples and 12% have a child below age one. Nearly half of the children in our sample are female (49.5%), and very few have experienced the loss of a parent (0.6% for mothers, 2.3% for fathers).

4. Methodology: Regression Discontinuity Design Approach

We exploit the income eligibility cutoff in RDD to identify the effect of receiving cash transfers. The eligibility criteria for households receiving FSP cash benefits is a per capita household income of less than one-third of the after-tax minimum wage. Hence, we expect a jump in FSP beneficiary status and child wellbeing outcomes at this cutoff value. We estimate these reduced-form effects of the income eligibility criterion with the sharp RDD specification,

$$y_{i,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_j + I (T_j = 0) x_j + I (T_i = 1) x_j + X_{i,j} \Gamma + u_{i,j},$$
(1)

where $y_{i,j}$ denotes the outcome variable for child *i* in household *j*. The treatment variable, *T*, takes the value of one when the household per capita income is less than one-third of the minimum wage and zero otherwise. We control for the linear trend in per-capita household income on the cutoff's left- and right-hand sides by the interaction of the indicator function *I*(.) and x_j where x_j is the per capita household income in household *j*. We also show the robustness of our results when we use a quadratic function of the running variable in Appendix B. X stands for the set of control variables, u for the error term, and β_1 gives the reduced-form effect of the income eligibility criterion on the outcome variable.

The control variables, *X*, include dummy variables for children's age, a dummy variable indicating female children, as well as dummy variables indicating if the mother and father of the children died. We control for the household composition by including a dummy variable if there are multiples below age 2, or an infant (less than age 1) within the household and also the number of adults and number of children in the following age groups: under age five, between five and twelve, and thirteen and above. Finally, we include dummies for the household head's education categories (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, and cannot work because of old age or disability). We cluster the standard errors at the household level in all regression analyses and use survey weights.

Some households with a per capita household income above the eligibility ratio receive other forms of family support by meeting other criteria, and not all households on the left-hand side of the cutoff receive cash transfers. Therefore, using a fuzzy RDD to measure the effect of being a beneficiary by using 2SLS estimation would have been possible. However, since the threshold is also significantly related to the food and shelter transfers as shown in Table 1, 2SLS regressions would be biased. For that reason, we only report the reduced-form results and interpret the coefficients accordingly.

In our analysis, we use parametric bandwidths for RDD. We restrict the bandwidth for per capita income to the range between 750 TL and 900 TL based on statistical considerations. Specifically, bandwidths narrower than 750 TL yield insufficient observations, and a statistically insignificant first stage, and 900 TL represents the maximum bandwidth where pre-determined characteristics remain statistically non-significant, thus preserving our RDD assumptions. As a result, we concentrate on bandwidths of 750, 800, 850, and 900 TL on both sides of the cutoff point.

4.3. Plausibility of the RDD Assumption

A potential threat to our identification strategy is the manipulation of the household income per capita variable to be eligible for the program. Our dataset was collected within six months of the program introduction, and a change in the household composition in this short period is very unlikely, especially through fertility response. Furthermore, manipulation of household income is

very difficult as the Ministry uses a three-step eligibility check for the program. First, during prescreening, they control for the requirements about applicants's citizenship, residential status, and the existence of a civil servant in the household. Second, eligible applicants undergo an evaluation by SASF, where the household's socioeconomic profile and income level are assessed. The income level is determined using a household approach, which involves calculating the per capita income within a household based on total household income and the number of members. This calculation incorporates data on the income, assets, and expenditures of all individuals in the household and follows the method used in the General Health Insurance Income Test. The necessary information is gathered through queries of institutional databases via the Integrated Social Assistance Information System or through household visits conducted by SASF, as well as declarations provided by the households themselves. Finally, the per capita income within the household is calculated by the SASF Board of Trustees. If it is less than one-third of the monthly net minimum wage, the household qualifies for assistance; otherwise, the application is rejected.

In addition to the institutional setup that makes it very difficult to manipulate the program eligibility, we present evidence supporting the plausibility of the identifying assumption—specifically, the smoothness of outcome variables in the running variable around the cutoff. This reinforces the validity of the RDD estimation strategy.

First, Appendix Figure A1 demonstrates the continuity of the score density around the cutoff. Due to the nature of the running variable, we observe mass points at the cutoff (one-third of the minimum wage), as well as at one-fourth and half of the minimum wage. However, the mass at one-third of the minimum wage threshold is not notably more pronounced than at other high-frequency points, which would have been expected if households had manipulated their income per capita. Additionally, the null hypothesis of no difference in density between the treatment and control groups at the cutoff is rejected at only the 10 percent level.

Second, we present evidence for the absence of policy effect on the pre-treatment covariates. The test results in Appendix Table A1 reveal that the households on the left- and right-hand side of the cutoff are comparable in terms of socioeconomic characteristics, mainly the household head's education and employment status. Among the covariates we test, we find a statistically significant jump at 10-percent level only one the household head's education category. When we look at the household composition covariates, we observe a jump in the number of children aged 5–12 in the household at the 5-percent level. This result is not surprising given the definition of our running

variable- household income per capita. When the households are similar in socioeconomic aspects and their income variation is limited within the 900TL per-capita income bandwidth around the cutoff, the households that are eligible for the assistance have more children. As a result, this could lead to an underestimation of the policy's impact on children, as the transfers are more likely to be received by larger households.

Lastly, we find no evidence of a policy impact when using alternative cutoffs on either side of the actual threshold. Appendix Table A2 presents the results of reduced-form regressions conducted at these alternative cutoffs. In this analysis, we examine the beneficiary status of FSP and food transfers, along with our main outcome variables—children's employment in paid and unpaid work and their time use. While we observe statistically significant effects in only four of the regressions (at the 5 percent level), these effects do not follow a systematic pattern. Therefore, we conclude that the observed discontinuity at one-third of the minimum wage cutoff is driven by the policy rather than an inherent feature of the data or the running variable, household income per capita.

5. Results

5.1. Main Results: Children's Work and Time-Use Outcomes

Figure 1 shows the discontinuity in FSP recipiency status at the threshold per capita income level. The RDD plot reveals a modest but statistically significant treatment effect. Although the point estimate for cash transfer recipiency shows a small jump at the income threshold, the confidence intervals on the treated side (left-hand side of the threshold) do not overlap with the mean outcome of the untreated side (right-hand side of the threshold). This suggests a meaningful treatment effect, even if the magnitude of the effect appears small.

Table 1 shows our RDD reduced-form results for the beneficiary status of the FSP transfers within the last 12 months. There is a 20-26 percentage point increase in the likelihood of receiving FSP with program eligibility status. The likelihood of receiving food and shelter support also increases with program eligibility. As Table 1 reveals, there is a positive impact of the income rule by 15.5-17 percentage points on food and shelter recipiency within the last 12 months.

Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate the proportion of children engaged in different types of work, comparing those on either side of the eligibility threshold for the cash transfer program, concentrating on outside and domestic work respectively. In Figure 2, a drop in the fraction of

children in family work is observed, however, no obvious drop at the cutoff is seen in the other outcome variables. Panel A in Table 3 presents the RDD results for the children's paid and unpaid work outcomes. The impact of the policy on paid-work participation is positive with very small and statistically insignificant coefficients. On the other hand, there is a substantial decrease in unpaid work participation with the policy. As the table reveals, children's likelihood of working in their family's business falls by 15.2 percentage points (with 5 percent statistical significance) in the narrowest bandwidth we use. There is some suggestive evidence for the fall in agricultural work participation however the significance of the results is not robust to using alternative bandwidths. In contrast, there is a small increase in the likelihood of children's engagement in selling homemade goods or agricultural products, only observed in the broader bandwidths. We also find a fall in doing any non-market work by 24 percentage points, which is working in the family business, selling homemade goods, or working in agriculture. The impact of the policy on school enrollment is positive with very small and statistically insignificant coefficients.

In Figure 3, there is a drop in the proportion of children who take care of the elderly and children. The regression results in Panel B of Table 3 suggest a drop in the domestic work participation of children, but they are not statistically significant. For domestic work, the policy reduces children's likelihood of cooking, but effects on other domestic tasks such as cleaning, care, and shopping are insignificant.

Figure 4 illustrates the time spent on paid, and unpaid employment and school work for children. Even though there is a drop in domestic work hours, these are not statistically significant as presented by the effect of the policy on children's time use in Table 4. While weekly hours spent on work and domestic work decrease, the changes are statistically insignificant. There is a positive but insignificant effect on school hours (daily) and study hours (weekday and weekend). These findings suggest that the policy reduces children's involvement in non-market family work and some domestic tasks like cooking but does not significantly impact time allocated to formal education or studying.

5.2.Other Results: Children's Daily Food Consumption, Health and Well-being The policy we study in this paper provides modest cash transfers to low-income families. We analyze its immediate effect as the dataset was collected six months after the program began. The eligibility rule is similar for the food and shelter transfers and impacts food and shelter transfer recipiency significantly. We find that the policy does not have any impact on children's paid work participation but decreases unpaid work participation, especially working in family business.

In this section, we analyze other variables to understand whether the policy had any effect on children's food consumption and their health and well-being.

Figure 5 shows the proportion of children who consume various food items daily. At the threshold, there is a drop in daily consumption of grains and unhealthy food items such as soda drinks, snacks and sweets. Table 5 examines the effect of per capita income eligibility on food consumption around the cutoff. For daily food intake, the policy significantly increases meat-based protein consumption at smaller income bandwidths (800–750 TL), while there is suggestive evidence for a decrease in soda consumption. The policy effects on other food categories like fruit, pulses, grain, sweets, and unhealthy snacks are statistically insignificant.

Finally, Figure 6 shows the children's health problems and their treatment status in the last two weeks. Table 6 explores the impact of per capita family income eligibility on children's health and well-being. For child health outcomes, the policy has no significant effect on general or untreated health problems but is associated with a reduction in children "seeming depressed or unhappy". There is evidence suggesting that the policy improves children's emotional well-being.

6. Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that even a modest cash transfer policy can generate meaningful improvements in child welfare during periods of economic hardship. Our analysis of Turkey's FSP reveals that within just six months, the program reduced young children's participation in non-market work, particularly in family businesses and agricultural activities. This finding is especially noteworthy given the program's relatively small transfer amounts and short duration, which constrains the scale of intervention needed to affect household labor decisions.

The program's impact extends beyond labor outcomes, with suggestive evidence of improved emotional well-being among recipient children and increased protein consumption. These benefits suggest that even limited cash support can help families better protect their children's welfare during economic difficulties. The increase in protein intake, potentially linked to the program's connection with food and shelter support, indicates important complementarities between different forms of social assistance.

However, our findings also highlight important limitations of standalone cash transfer programs. The absence of significant changes in time spent on schoolwork, despite reduced labor participation, suggests that financial constraints may not be the only barrier to educational engagement. This aligns with broader evidence from the cash transfer literature indicating that program impacts often depend on the integration of multiple interventions (Dammert et al., 2018). The Turkish context, with its already high baseline school enrollment rates among young children, further underscores the need to look beyond access when considering educational outcomes.

Our results have several important implications for policy design. First, they suggest that even modest support can generate meaningful benefits for child welfare. Second, the quick emergence of positive effects (within six months) indicates that cash transfers can serve as effective emergency response tools. Third, the simultaneous improvement in nutritional intake and emotional well-being, alongside reduced child labor, suggests that even modest transfers can trigger multiple positive changes in household behavior.

Finally, our findings contribute to ongoing debates about social protection program design during economic crises. While conditional cash transfers and larger-scale interventions remain important tools for poverty reduction, our results suggest that more modest, unconditional transfer policies can still play a valuable role in protecting child welfare during periods of economic stress. This has particular relevance for policymakers in middle-income countries trying to address the immediate needs of vulnerable populations.

One caveat of our study is our inability to be able to explain the underlying mechanism, mainly because we lack data on household assets or detailed information about the household head's main economic activity. More comprehensive data collection on household economic activities and assets would help illuminate the mechanisms through which cash transfers influence family decisions about child labor. Additionally, future research should examine whether these short-term benefits persist after the program ends and explore potential threshold effects in transfer size.

Tables and Figures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita	Family Inco	me on Both S	Sides of the
		Cutof	f (TL)	
	900	850	800	750
FSP				
Policy Effect	0.198***	0.203***	0.248***	0.263***
	[0.076]	[0.077]	[0.086]	[0.089]
CCT				
Policy Effect	0.021	0.024	0.028	0.006
	[0.038]	[0.039]	[0.044]	[0.040]
Education Mate	erial			
Policy Effect	-0.021	-0.023	-0.018	-0.041
	[0.058]	[0.059]	[0.065]	[0.063]
Food and Shelt	er			
Policy Effect	0.172***	0.176***	0.153***	0.155***
	[0.051]	[0.052]	[0.054]	[0.057]
Disability and C	Old-Age Bene	fits		
Policy Effect	0.038	0.036	0.004	0.013
	[0.058]	[0.058]	[0.061]	[0.064]
Health Benefit				
Policy Effect	-0.095	-0.085	-0.113	-0.097
	[0.081]	[0.083]	[0.091]	[0.096]
Other Benefit				
Policy Effect	-0.024	-0.022	-0.017	-0.026
	[0.038]	[0.039]	[0.045]	[0.047]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

 Table 1: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Receiving Social Transfers

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the receipt of other programs within the past 12 months. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5-13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

A) Child Labor & School Enrolment	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	F) Social Transfers	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Paid Employment	0.003	0.057	0	1	FSP	0.133	0.340	0	1
Works for the Family	0.033	0.179	0	1	CCT	0.018	0.133	0	1
Works in Agriculture	0.091	0.288	0	1	Education Material	0.045	0.208	0	1
Sells Produce	0.004	0.061	0	1	Food and Shelter	0.059	0.236	0	1
Any Non-market Work	0.102	0.303	0	1	Disability and Old-Age	0.043	0.203	0	1
Enrolled in School	0.961	0.194	0	1	Health Benefit	0.065	0.247	0	1
B) Domestic Work					Other Benefit	0.019	0.138	0	1
Cooking	0.086	0.280	0	1	G) Control Variables				
Cleaning	0.149	0.356	0	1	Household Head Educ	ation			
Child and Elderly Care	0.087	0.282	0	1	Missing	0.071	0.256	0	1
Shopping	0.337	0.473	0	1	Middle School	0.531	0.499	0	1
Any Domestic Work	0.418	0.493	0	1	Secondary	0.279	0.449	0	1
C) Time Spent In Work, School or Stu	udying				Higher	0.119	0.324	0	1
Work Hours (Weekly)	0.370	1.710	0	40	Household Head Emp	loymen	t		
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)	0.925	2.947	0	66	Employed	0.740	0.439	0	1
School Hours (Daily)	5.656	2.406	0	15	Unemployed	0.040	0.196	0	1
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)	3.957	5.670	0	80	Not in LF	0.137	0.344	0	1
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)	1.880	2.707	0	16	Old/Disabled	0.083	0.276	0	1
D) Daily Food Consumption					Household Composition	on			
Fruits	0.545	0.498	0	1	Nbr Under 5	0.358	0.563	0	3
Vegetables	0.326	0.469	0	1	Nbr Between 5 and 12	1.650	0.716	1	5
Proteins	0.116	0.320	0	1	Nbr Between 13 and 17	0.414	0.615	0	3
Pulses	0.109	0.311	0	1	Nbr of Adults	2.503	0.978	1	8
Grain	0.658	0.474	0	1	Any Multiples	0.008	0.087	0	1
Dairy Products	0.591	0.492	0	1	Any Child Under 1	0.116	0.320	0	1
Soda Drink	0.158	0.365	0	1	Child Characteristics				
Sweets	0.364	0.481	0	1	Female	0.495	0.500	0	1
Unhealthy Snacks	0.236	0.425	0	1	Mother Died	0.006	0.077	0	1
E) Child's Health & Social Wellbeing					Father Died	0.023	0.150	0	1
Health Problem (last 2 weeks)	0.278	0.448	0	1					
Health Problem Untreated (last 2 weeks)	0.075	0.263	0	1					
Seems Depressed/Unhappy	0.325	0.468	0	1					
Seems Anxious/Worried	0.355	0.479	0	1					

Notes: The data come from TurkStat's 2022 Turkey Child Survey. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within 900TL bandwidth on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. Number of observations is 4006 except seeming depressed (N=3992), seeming anxious (N=3989) which has some missing values replied as "Unknown" to the survey question.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Per Cap	oita Family	Income	on Both		Per Caj	oita Family	Income	on Both
	Sides of the Cutoff (TL) Side					des of the	es of the Cutoff (TL)		
A) Child Labor &									
School Enrolment	900	850	800	750	B) Domestic Work	900	850	800	750
Paid Employment					Cooking				
Policy Effect	0.014	0.015	0.021	0.023	Policy Effect	-0.196*	-0.209**	-0.196*	-0.224*
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.019]		[0.105]	[0.104]	[0.116]	[0.116]
Works for the Family					Cleaning				
Policy Effect	-0.127*	-0.121*	-0.149**	-0.152**	Policy Effect	-0.113	-0.117	-0.107	-0.078
	[0.068]	[0.069]	[0.073]	[0.074]		[0.129]	[0.130]	[0.144]	[0.149]
Works in Agriculture					Child and Elderly Care				
Policy Effect	-0.209**	-0.192*	-0.179	-0.171	Policy Effect	-0.155	-0.148	-0.158	-0.149
	[0.101]	[0.103]	[0.114]	[0.119]		[0.096]	[0.097]	[0.108]	[0.108]
Sells Produce					Shopping				
Policy Effect	0.033*	0.035**	0.023	0.025	Policy Effect	-0.041	-0.059	-0.049	0.060
	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.017]		[0.157]	[0.159]	[0.172]	[0.178]
Any Non-market Work					Any Domestic Work				
Policy Effect	-0.257**	-0.237**	-0.239*	-0.238*	Policy Effect	-0.116	-0.134	-0.128	-0.063
-	[0.110]	[0.112]	[0.123]	[0.127]	-	[0.159]	[0.161]	[0.173]	[0.181]
Enrolled in School									
Policy Effect	0.034	0.033	0.030	0.042					
-	[0.044]	[0.045]	[0.049]	[0.050]					
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628	Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Table 3: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Child Labor, Domestic Work

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 and 5-8 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the dependent variables given in panels A and B. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
	Per Cap	oita Family	y Income	on Both			
Time Spent In Work, School	Sides of the Cutoff (TL)						
or Studying	900	850	800	750			
Work Hours (Weekly)							
Policy Effect	-0.596	-0.513	-0.418	-0.449			
	[0.603]	[0.615]	[0.700]	[0.729]			
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)							
Policy Effect	-0.964	-1.028	-1.064	-0.797			
	[0.897]	[0.899]	[1.004]	[1.037]			
School Hours (Daily)							
Policy Effect	0.620	0.610	0.395	0.308			
	[0.425]	[0.421]	[0.445]	[0.457]			
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)							
Policy Effect	0.063	0.069	0.047	0.059			
	[1.069]	[1.078]	[1.147]	[1.171]			
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)							
Policy Effect	0.376	0.415	0.988	1.106			
	[0.877]	[0.885]	[0.977]	[1.006]			
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628			

Table 4: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Children's Time Use

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the dependent variables given on the first column. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

	Per Capita	Family Incol	me on Both S	Sides of the
		Cutor		
Daily Food Consumption	900	850	800	750
Fruit				
Policy Effect	-0.101	-0.048	0.164	0.162
	[0.182]	[0.183]	[0.195]	[0.200]
Vegetables				
Policy Effect	-0.154	-0.133	-0.198	-0.164
5	[0.173]	[0.176]	[0.190]	[0.195]
Protein	[]	[0.2.0]	[0.22.0]	[]
Policy Effect	0.236*	0.245*	0.332**	0.340**
j	[0.127]	[0.129]	[0.144]	[0.151]
Pulses	[01127]	[0.1_2]	[011.1]	[01101]
Policy Effect	0 099	0 101	0 1 5 4	0 144
Toney Effect	[0.129]	[0.132]	0.134 [0.147]	[0 152]
Grain	[0.127]	[0.132]	[0.147]	[0.152]
Doliov Effort	0.026	0.025	0.022	0.024
Foncy Effect	0.020	0.023	0.033	-0.024
	[0.170]	[0.172]	[0.180]	[0.192]
Dairy	0.100	0.00 -	0.040	0.000
Policy Effect	-0.108	-0.095	-0.043	-0.023
	[0.176]	[0.178]	[0.193]	[0.199]
Soda				
Policy Effect	-0.300**	-0.272**	-0.262*	-0.244
	[0.128]	[0.131]	[0.144]	[0.150]
Sweets				
Policy Effect	0.045	0.040	0.048	0.079
	[0.180]	[0.182]	[0.198]	[0.204]
Unhealthy Snacks				
Policy Effect	-0.158	-0.114	-0.145	-0.106
	[0.159]	[0.161]	[0.174]	[0.180]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Table 5: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Children's Food Consumption(1)(2)(3)(4)

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the dependent variables given on the first column. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita	Family Inco Cutof	me on Both S f (TL)	Sides of the
Child's Health and Wellbeing	900	850	800	750
Health Problem				
Policy Effect	0.013	-0.003	0.020	-0.039
	[0.154]	[0.155]	[0.168]	[0.175]
Untreated Health Problem				
Policy Effect	0.102	0.105	0.098	0.111
	[0.107]	[0.109]	[0.117]	[0.123]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628
Seems Depressed/Unhappy				
Policy Effect	-0.308*	-0.278*	-0.241	-0.269
	[0.157]	[0.160]	[0.177]	[0.182]
Observations	3,992	3,968	3,676	3,614
Seems Anxious/Worried				
Policy Effect	-0.220	-0.227	-0.252	-0.292
	[0.161]	[0.163]	[0.178]	[0.183]
Observations	3,989	3,965	3,673	3,612

 Table 6: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Children's Health and Emotional Wellbeing

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the dependent variables given on the first column. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

Figure 1: Discontinuity in FSP recipiency



Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows FSP recipiency within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff.



Figure 2: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Child Labor Outcomes and School Enrollment

Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children younger than 13.



Figure 3: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Domestic Work Outcomes

Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children younger than 13.



Figure 4: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Weekly Work and Study Hours

Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children younger than 13.



Figure 5: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Daily Food Consumption Outcomes

Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children 5-12 years old.



Figure 6: The Effect of the Income Eligibility Rule on Child Health Outcomes

Notes: Source: Turkey Child Survey, 2022. The graph shows the outcomes within 900TL on both sides of the cutoff for children ages 5-12.

Appendix Tables and Figures





Notes: Manipulation test using the local polynomial density estimators proposed in Cattaneo et al. (2018). Stata command rddensity. A local quadratic approximation with kernel epanechnikov weights is used to construct the density estimators, while a cubic approximation is used for the bias-corrected density estimator. The density estimation method is restricted-assuming equal distribution function and higher-order derivatives. Robust bias-corrected statistic with asymptotic plugin standard errors and uniform confidence interval at 95% level (2000 of simulations). T= 1.7227, p-value = 0.0849

Table A1: Policy Effect on the Pretreatment Covariates

Household Head Education	RD Effect	p-value
Missing	-0.015	0.881
Middle School	0.189	0.339
Secondary	-0.338*	0.065
Higher	0.164	0.284
Household Head		
Employment		
Employed	0.132	0.451
Unemployed	0.055	0.227
Not in LF	-0.117	0.325
Old/Disabled	-0.070	0.627
Household Composition		
Nbr Under 5	0.248	0.228
Nbr Between 5 and 12	0.848**	0.016
Nbr Between 13 and 17	0.186	0.364
Nbr of Adults	-0.031	0.947
Any Multiples	0.016	0.756
Any Child Under 1	-0.077	0.557
Child Characteristics		
Female	-0.019	0.906
Mother Died	0.017	0.444
Father Died	0.012	0.849
Notes: Data from the Turkey Child	Survey (TCS),	2022.The

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within 900 TL on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The sample size is 4007. The dependent variable is given on the first column. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

	Sample: Lef	ft-Hand Side	of Actual Cutoff	Sample: Lef	t-Hand Side	of Actual Cu
	Loc	cation of the A	lternative Cutoff re	lative to the A	ctual Cutoff in	TL
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A) Program Beneficiary	-800	-600	-400	400	600	800
FSP	-0.116	0.006	-0.075*	-0.132	0.035	0.000
	[0.228]	[0.063]	[0.042]	[0.318]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Food and Shelter	-0.041	-0.021	0.034	0.059	-0.005	0.015
	[0.151]	[0.039]	[0.037]	[0.167]	[0.012]	[0.013]
Paid Employment	0.009	0.009	-0.008	0.025	-0.003	0.004
	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.023]	[0.005]	[0.004]
Works for the Family	0.092	-0.016	0.011	-0.105	-0.020	-0.012
	[0.098]	[0.025]	[0.022]	[0.341]	[0.015]	[0.036]
Works in Agriculture	0.204	0.025	-0.003	0.270	-0.066*	0.057
	[0.169]	[0.036]	[0.028]	[0.433]	[0.035]	[0.041]
Sells Produce	0.032	-0.010	0.010	0.039	-0.006	-0.008
	[0.029]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.042]	[0.006]	[0.018]
Any Non-market Work	0.299*	0.028	0.005	0.363	-0.078**	0.053
	[0.176]	[0.039]	[0.032]	[0.458]	[0.038]	[0.048]
Enrolled in School	-0.134	-0.004	0.003	0.269	0.017	-0.026
	[0.098]	[0.023]	[0.016]	[0.208]	[0.014]	[0.017]
B) Domestic Work						
Cooking	-0.132	-0.037	0.021	-0.036	0.032	0.015
	[0.147]	[0.034]	[0.020]	[0.497]	[0.039]	[0.054]
Cleaning	0.122	-0.028	0.021	-0.470	0.005	-0.013
	[0.189]	[0.045]	[0.032]	[0.614]	[0.048]	[0.070]
Child and Elderly Care	0.216*	0.041	0.006	0.293	-0.027	0.040
	[0.130]	[0.039]	[0.027]	[0.426]	[0.032]	[0.040]
Shopping	0.098	0.059	-0.021	-0.881	0.020	-0.017
	[0.262]	[0.063]	[0.044]	[0.716]	[0.074]	[0.101]
Any Domestic Work	0.081	-0.024	0.013	-0.679	0.009	0.008
	[0.262]	[0.062]	[0.045]	[0.694]	[0.073]	[0.100]
C) Time Spent In Work, School or Studying						
Work Hours (Weekly)	1.548*	0.278	-0.057	1.506	-0.515**	0.388
	[0.839]	[0.238]	[0.163]	[2.871]	[0.218]	[0.239]
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)	1.693	0.289	-0.294	-3.480	0.152	-0.644
	[1.488]	[0.263]	[0.262]	[4.378]	[0.334]	[0.536]
School Hours (Daily)	-1.102	0.085	0.078	2.429	-0.112	-0.071
	[0.788]	[0.188]	[0.136]	[1.861]	[0.174]	[0.327]
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)	3.144	1.716**	0.078	8.399	-0.062	1.280
	[2.981]	[0.810]	[0.576]	[8.791]	[0.917]	[1.354]
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)	0.507	0.504	-0.075	-0.077	-0.143	1.058**
	[1.480]	[0.446]	[0.257]	[3.789]	[0.490]	[0.519]
	2,908	2,908	2,908	1,098	1,098	1,098

Table A2: Continuity Analysis with Alternative Cutoffs

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within 900 TL bandwidth on the left and right side of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status based on alternative cutoffs given on columns 1-3 and 4-6 on the dependent variables given in panels A,B, and C. The regressions include controls for split-linear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Per Capita	Family Inco	me on Both S	Sides of the
		Cutof	f (TL)	
	900	850	800	750
FSP				
Policy Effect	0.163***	0.165***	0.181***	0.189***
	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.045]	[0.047]
CCT				
Policy Effect	0.016	0.017	0.019	0.009
	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.021]
Education Mate	rial			
Policy Effect	0.005	0.003	0.006	-0.005
	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.033]	[0.033]
Food and Shelte	er			
Policy Effect	0.113***	0.114***	0.101***	0.102***
	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.029]
Disability and C	Old-Age Bene	efits		
Policy Effect	0.024	0.024	0.008	0.012
	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.032]	[0.033]
Health Benefit				
Policy Effect	-0.037	-0.032	-0.047	-0.039
	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.046]	[0.048]
Other Benefit				
Policy Effect	-0.005	-0.004	-0.002	-0.006
	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.023]	[0.024]
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628

Table B1: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Receiving Social Transfers-Quadratic Function ofthe Running Variable

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the receipt of other programs within the past 12 months. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5-13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

Table B2: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Child Labor, Domestic Work-Quadratic Function of the Running Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
	Per Cap	oita Famil	y Income	on Both		Per Caj	pita Family	Income	on Both	
	Si	des of the	Cutoff (T	'L)		Si	Sides of the Cutoff (TL)			
A) Child Labor	900	850	800	750	B) Domestic Work	900	850	800	750	
Paid Employment					Cooking					
Policy Effect	0.007	0.008	0.011	0.011	Policy Effect	-0.100*	-0.107**	-0.099*	-0.112*	
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.010]		[0.053]	[0.052]	[0.059]	[0.059]	
Works for the Family					Cleaning					
Policy Effect	-0.070*	-0.067*	-0.083**	-0.084**	Policy Effect	-0.058	-0.060	-0.057	-0.043	
	[0.036]	[0.037]	[0.039]	[0.040]		[0.065]	[0.065]	[0.073]	[0.076]	
Works in Agriculture					Child and Elderly Care					
Policy Effect	-0.104**	-0.096*	-0.093	-0.089	Policy Effect	-0.070	-0.067	-0.072	-0.069	
	[0.052]	[0.053]	[0.059]	[0.061]		[0.048]	[0.049]	[0.055]	[0.055]	
Any Non-market Work					Shopping					
Policy Effect	-0.135**	-0.125**	-0.130**	-0.130**	Policy Effect	-0.009	-0.018	-0.023	0.030	
	[0.057]	[0.058]	[0.064]	[0.066]		[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.087]	[0.089]	
					Any Domestic Work					
					Policy Effect	-0.045	-0.053	-0.06	-0.029	
						[0.081]	[0.081]	[0.087]	[0.091]	
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628	Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628	
Notes: Data from the Turk	ey Child S	urvey (TC	S), 2022.T	he sample in	ncludes children aged 5-1	2, living i	n household	ls with per	capita	

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 and 5-8 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the receipt of other programs within the past 12 months. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

Table B3: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Children's Time Use -Quadratic Function of the Running Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
	Per Cap	oita Family	y Income o	on Both			
Time Spent In Work, School	Sides of the Cutoff (TL)						
or Studying	900	850	800	750			
Work Hours (Weekly)							
Policy Effect	-0.354	-0.315	-0.282	-0.296			
	[0.316]	[0.320]	[0.366]	[0.378]			
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)							
Policy Effect	-0.534	-0.567	-0.613	-0.483			
	[0.469]	[0.470]	[0.527]	[0.542]			
School Hours (Daily)							
Policy Effect	0.302	0.299	0.200	0.159			
	[0.208]	[0.206]	[0.222]	[0.228]			
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)							
Policy Effect	0.063	0.069	0.047	0.059			
	[1.069]	[1.078]	[1.147]	[1.171]			
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)							
Policy Effect	0.063	0.082	0.365	0.421			
	[0.436]	[0.440]	[0.494]	[0.507]			
Observations	4,006	3,982	3,690	3,628			

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the receipt of other programs within the past 12 months. The regression includes controls for split-quadratic trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

Table C1: The Effect of the Income Criterion on Outcomes -Excluding the Food and Shelter Beneficiaries from the Sample

	(4)		(2)	(1)	-	(=)	(0)	(7)	(0)
-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Per Capita	Family Inco	me on Both S	sides of the		Per Capita	Family Inco	me on Both S	oides of the
A) Program					E) Daily Food				
Beneficiary	900	850	800	750	Consumption	900	850	800	750
FSP	0.146*	0.149*	0.185**	0.203**	Fruit	-0.111	-0.06	0.164	0.163
	[0.075]	[0.076]	[0.085]	[0.088]		[0.184]	[0.185]	[0.197]	[0.202]
B) Child Labor & So	chooling				Vegetables	-0.155	-0.136	-0.191	-0.154
Paid Employment	0.010	0.010	0.013	0.015		[0.175]	[0.178]	[0.192]	[0.198]
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.017]	Protein	0.240*	0.246*	0.331**	0.339**
Works for the Family	-0.123*	-0.117*	-0.153**	-0.156**		[0.129]	[0.131]	[0.146]	[0.153]
	[0.069]	[0.070]	[0.073]	[0.074]	Pulses	0.115	0.116	0.163	0.152
Works in Agriculture	-0.178*	-0.16	-0.144	-0.135		[0.132]	[0.134]	[0.149]	[0.154]
	[0.103]	[0.105]	[0.115]	[0.120]	Grain	0.003	0.001	0.011	-0.051
Sells Produce	0.040**	0.042**	0.030**	0.032**		[0.172]	[0.173]	[0.189]	[0.195]
	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.016]	Dairy	-0.138	-0.126	-0.069	-0.051
Any Non-market Work	-0.228**	-0.207*	-0.213*	-0.212*		[0.178]	[0.180]	[0.195]	[0.202]
	[0.111]	[0.113]	[0.124]	[0.129]	Soda	-0.290**	-0.260*	-0.259*	-0.239
Enrolled in School	0.048	0.048	0.047	0.060		[0.131]	[0.133]	[0.146]	[0.152]
	[0.044]	[0.045]	[0.050]	[0.050]	Sweets	0.052	0.046	0.061	0.095
C) Domestic Work						[0.183]	[0.184]	[0.201]	[0.206]
Cooking	-0.192*	-0.201*	-0.192*	-0.222*	Unhealthy Snacks	-0.141	-0.096	-0.134	-0.091
5	[0.106]	[0.106]	[0.117]	[0.117]	2	[0.160]	[0.162]	[0.176]	[0.182]
Cleaning	-0.105	-0.109	-0.111	-0.078	Observations	3.757	3.735	3.482	3.421
6	[0.129]	[0.131]	[0.144]	[0.150]	F) Child's Health and Welll	being	- ,	-, -	- /
Child and Elderly Care	-0.145	-0.137	-0.147	-0.135	Health Problem	0.003	-0.011	0.001	-0.061
,,	[0.097]	[0.098]	[0.109]	[0.110]		[0.156]	[0.157]	[0.171]	[0.178]
Shopping	-0.057	-0.077	-0.07	0.037	Untreated Health Problem	0.104	0.108	0.095	0.106
	[0.159]	[0.161]	[0.173]	[0.179]		[0.108]	[0.110]	[0.118]	[0.124]
Any Domestic Work	-0.145	-0.163	-0.169	-0.104	Observations	3.757	3.735	3.482	3.421
,	[0.161]	[0.163]	[0.175]	[0.182]	Seems Depressed/Unhappy	-0.306*	-0.272*	-0.247	-0.273
D) Time Spent In W	ork. School	or Studying	[]	[0110-]		[0.159]	[0.161]	[0.179]	[0.184]
Work Hours (Weekly)	-0 498	-0.410	-0 324	-0 354	Observations	3 743	3 721	3 468	3 407
······································	[0.613]	[0.625]	[0 711]	[0 741]	Seems Anxious/Worried	-0.233	-0.237	-0.258	-0.296
Domestic Work Hours (Weekly)	-0 791	-0.853	-0.942	-0.666	Policy Effect	[0.162]	[0 165]	10 1811	[0 186]
Domeste Work Hours (Weekly)	[0 914]	[0 917]	[1.028]	[1.062]	Observations	3 740	3 718	3 465	3 405
School Hours (Daily)	0.652	0.644	0 327	0 244	e eser valoris	5,710	5,710	5,105	5,105
Sensor froms (Bury)	[0.431]	[0 427]	[0.450]	[0 464]					
Weekday Study Hours (Weekly)	0.521	0.528	0.408	0.423					
	[2 067]	[2 087]	[2 208]	[2 258]					
Weekend Study Hours (Weekly)	0.329	0.375	0.874	0.992					
(Weekly)	10 8861	10 8961	10.0861	[1 015]					
Observations	3 757	3 735	3 /82	3 /21					
	5,151	5,155	5,702	5,721					

Notes: Data from the Turkey Child Survey (TCS), 2022. The sample includes children aged 5-12, living in households with per capita income within the bandwidths given on columns 1-4 and 5-8 on both sides of the one-third of the minimum wage cutoff. the sample excludes households who received food and shelter benefits within the last 12 months. The table displays the coefficient of per-capita income eligibility status on the dependent variables given in panels A and B. The regressions include controls for splitlinear trends on both sides of the cutoff. Additional controls include dummies for child's age, gender, indicators for whether the mother or father died, dummies for the household head's education level (missing, primary/middle, secondary, and higher) and employment status (employed, unemployed, out of labor force, unable to work) a dummy for existence of multiples, and children under age 1, the number of children in three age groups (below 5, ages 5–13, and above 13), and the number of adults in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

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